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WHEN CRIME PAYS: MEASURING
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE AGAINST
CORRUPTION IN BRAZIL
Carlos Higino Ribeiro de Alencar* & Ivo T. Gico Jr.**
ABSTRACT
There is a widespread perception in Brazil that civil servants caught in
corrupt practices are not punished. Yet, until now, there was no hard evi-
dence that would support such a claim and some argued that this was just a
misled perception due to the recent increase in anti-corruption measures.
One of the main reasons for this notable absence is the difficulty of identi-
fying actual cases of corruption with which to evaluate whether the actors
are actually punished by the judicial system. This paper uses the Brazilian
triple responsibility system as a natural experiment to assess judicial system
performance against corruption. Our results show that, in fact, the Brazil-
ian judicial system is highly ineffective against corruption, with a lower
than five percent probability of conviction.
Keywords: Corruption, Public Administration, Legal Procedure, Judici-
ary Enforcement, Brazil.
JEL: D73, K14, K42
RESUMO:
Hd uma percepgdo generalizada no Brasil de que funciondrios ptiblicos
corruptos ndo sdo punidos. Nao obstante, atg o momento, ndo hd
evidincias empiricas que ap6iem essa afirmagdo e muitos argumentam que
se trata de uma percepgdo equivocada decorrente do aumento de medidas
anticorrupgdo. Uma das principais razd5es para essa notdvel ausincia d a
grande dificuldade de se identificar casos comprovados de corrupgdo para
entdo se averiguar se eles foram ou ndo punidos pelo sistema judicial. 0
presente trabalho usa o sistema brasileiro de responsabilidade triplice
como um experimento natural para medir o desempenho do sistema judi-
cial contra corrupgdo. Nossos resultados mostram que o sistema judicial
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brasileiro 6 altamente ineficaz no combate d corrupgdo, sendo a
probabilidade de ser punido menor do que cinco por cento.
Palavras-Chaves: Corruppo, Administraqio Pdblica, Processo Legal,
Judicidrio, Eficicia, Brasil.
JEL: D73, K14, K42
I. INTRODUCTIONCORRUPTION is a pervasive phenomenon. It has been reported
since ancient times and in practically all societies through time,
even today. Some societies have been able to restrict corruption
closer to an efficient level, though not eliminate it, while in others, cor-
ruption remains endemic. It is not at all clear how each society achieved
the current equilibrium and how one changes itself from one type of soci-
ety to the other. In any case, most if not all scholars agree that corruption
can be a serious obstacle to social cooperation and development. There-
fore, corruption is a problem that is worth fighting against.
There is a widespread perception in Brazil that civil servants caught in
corrupt practices are not punished. Yet, until now, there was no hard
evidence that would support such a claim and some argued that this was
just a misled perception due to the recent increase in anti-corruption
measures. One of the main reasons for this notable absence is the diffi-
culty of identifying actual cases of corruption with which to measure
whether the actors are actually punished by the judicial system. This pa-
per employs the Brazilian triple responsibility system as a natural experi-
ment to assess the judicial system's performance against corruption cases.
The anti-corruption system in Brazil allows corrupt agents to be prose-
cuted independently by both administrative committees and judicial
courts. These prosecutions are completely independent, but they grossly
abide to the same legal infrastructure and all evidence collected in one
proceeding can be borrowed by the other. Hence, one would expect that
once a corrupt agent is identified by one system, he or she would quickly
be prosecuted and punished by the other. If that were the case, then the
redundant system would actually impose higher punishment on corrupt
civil servants.
In our paper, we explore this redundant punishment system to estimate
judicial performance against corruption. Assuming that all corrupt
agents punished by administrative committees are actual corruption
cases, we use this sample as a proxy for all corruption occurrences and
then try to identify whether the judicial system is able to identify these
cases and actually punish the corrupt agent. Here, judicial system is
broadly defined as encompassing not only judges, but also public prosecu-
tors, lawyers, police officers, etc. Unfortunately, our results show that, in
fact, the Brazilian judicial system is highly ineffective against corruption.
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II. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIME
A. LAw ENFORCEMENT, PENALTIES, AND RATIONAL BEHAVIOR
Originally employed by economists to explain consumption and pro-
duction, the Rational Choice Theory has become a well-known frame-
work to explain human behavior in many other social sciences in the last
sixty years, including sociology, political science, and law. The applica-
tion of this theoretical framework to legal issues connected with criminal-
ity started last century with Gary Becker's seminal article Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach (Becker 1968), and became known
as the Economic Theory of Crime.
According to this theory, the key to understanding criminal behavior is
to assume that most people commit an offense only if the perceived ex-
pected utility to them exceeds the utility they could get by employing
their time and other resources at other activities, such as obtaining a reg-
ular job. As a result, some people become criminals "not because their
basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their ben-
efits and costs differ."' This approach brought back the debate between
retributive and dissuasive effects of criminal penalties2 and can be sum-
marized as follows:
E[U] = (I - p) * U(R) - p * U(R - c), [1]
where E[U] is the individual expected utility for committing a crime, p is
the punishment probability (therefore, (I - p) is the probability of not
being punished), U is the individual utility function, R is the income ob-
tained with the illicit activity, and c is the cost of being punished.
On the one hand, the first term of the equation (1 -p) * U(R) indicates
the possibility of not being punished. Note that (1 -p) is the probability
that weighs the individual utility considering only the potential gains re-
sulting from the offense, U(R). On the other hand, the second term
p * U(R - c) weights the probability of being punished (p) with the indi-
vidual disutility resulting from punishment plus incurred costs. Accord-
ing to this model, when expectation E[U] is positive, the agent has an
incentive to commit the illicit act, otherwise, he does not. Here, punish-
ment probability and magnitude are the key elements in the juseconomic
analysis of criminal behavior.
1. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pot. ECON.
169, 176 (1968).
2. At the end of the 18th century and first half of the 19th century, one could identify
two great philosophical approaches to criminal punishments: one followed by Kant
and Hegel and the other defended by Beccaria and Bentham. The first one ar-
gued, essentially, for a retributive character of the penalty, i.e., a species of Talion
law applied by a professional jurist that would impose on the prisoner a penalty
causing him similar pain as that resulting from the criminal act. The second ap-
proach argued that the imposed penalty would have to be calculated in order to be
sufficient to prevent the occurrence of crime. Becker retakes the argument of this
second line of thinking.
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It should be clear by now that, according to the theory, criminal activity
is highly dependent on the factors that influence the allocation of time in
legal and illegal activities (opportunity cost).
This theory was tested in empirical research such as in Participation in
Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis (Ehrlich 1974), which found
supporting evidence indicating that there is a statistically relevant nega-
tive relationship between punishment probability and occurrence of all
types of crimes. Even more interesting is the fact that the same study
found a similar relationship between punishment magnitude and crime
rate, though only with statistical significance for half the cases. This em-
pirical evidence may indicate that the certainty of being caught may pro-
duce a stronger deterrence effect than the severity of punishment when
people are actually caught.
B. ECONOMIc THEORY OF CORRUPTION
When applying the general Economic Theory of Crime to corruption
cases, it should be kept in mind that our research deals only with public
civil servants. This means that the most relevant opportunity cost in-
volved in being corrupt is not represented by other allowed activities that
could be undertaken by the civil servant, but by the potential loss of
wages, retirement, and other benefits the civil servant may forfeit if
caught. Therefore, some adjustments to the general model may be re-
quired and we do it A la Bowles (Bowles 2001).
Suppose an individual wishes an illegal income, R, which may result
from a tax evasion, an overpriced commodity sold to the government, or
some similar scheme. In order to obtain this income, normally there must
be collusion, ergo, a bribe will be paid. We will call it B for bribe. There
is a probability, p, that this collusion is discovered and reported by a third
party such as an external auditor, the agent's boss, a co-worker, or an
injured competitor. If the scheme is discovered, then the corruptor is
likely to be effectively punished by a penalty, J, applied by the judiciary.
This penalty may involve both criminal (prison time or fines) and civil
sanctions (fines). As a result, corruption is only worth it for the corruptor
agent if:
(1 - p) (R - B) - p (J + B) = 0.
The first term of the equation represents the situation where corrup-
tion is not detected, indicated by the illegal income obtained by the indi-
vidual (R) less the cost of this income (bribe B), weighted by the chance
of not being discovered (1 -p). If the offense is discovered, the individual
will be subject to a penalty, J, and additionally, will have incurred a cost
in the bribe B anyway. As p is the probability of being punished, p (J +
B) represents the expected burden of being caught.
If we rearrange the terms in order to isolate B and call Bs the upper
limit that an individual would be willing to pay (maximum value of the
bribe), then the model gives us:
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R - B-pR +pB -pJ-pB = 0
R - B -pR -pl=0
R -pR -pl= B
Bs = (1 -p) R -pJ. [2]
As for the corrupted servant, she is vulnerable not only to a penalty, J,
resulting from criminal and civil judicial sanctions, but also to an addi-
tional penalty called A that represents her opportunity cost as a civil ser-
vant. In this case, the opportunity cost involves the potential loss of any
benefit she may forfeit such as future wages, pensions, and health benefits
resulting from administrative sanctions. These lost opportunity costs are
inapplicable to the corruptor agent. Hence, for the servant, corruption
(bribes or kickbacks) is interesting only if:
(1 - p) B - p (A + J) = 0,
where (1 - p) represents the probability of not being punished, which,
multiplied by bribe B, must be greater than the chance of being punished
(p), multiplied by the judicial and administrative burden potentially sup-
ported by the servant. If we rearrange the terms in order to isolate B and
call B' the lower limit that a servant would be willing to receive (mini-
mum value of the bribe), the model gives us:
B' = p (A + J) / (I - p). [3]
From equations [2] and [3] we can show that corruption is likely to
happen only if the upper limit of an individual's willingness to bribe is
greater than the lower limit of the servant reserve bribe or Bs = B', which
implies:
Bs = B'
R (1 - p) - pJ = p (A + J) / (I - p)
R (1 - p) = [p (A + J) + pJ (1 - p)] / (I - p)
R (1 - p) = [pA + 2 pJ - p2J] / (I - p)
R=[pA +2pJ -p 2J]/( _p) 2 . [4]
This model suggests some interesting conclusions. First, the corruption
level is continuous and not discrete; in other words, the degree of corrup-
tion is linked with the incentive structure of the agents involved so that
there are many possible levels of corruption. We may even talk about an
efficient level of corruption (Mookherjee & Png, 1995),3 just like we nor-
mally talk of an efficient level of pollution or any other human activity.
Second, an increase in the judicial sanction to the individual (J) tends
to reduce corruption, because it increases the individual's cost if he is
caught (pJ in equation [2]), which reduces Bs, because pJ has negative
sign, even if B' is kept constant. Analogously, if the penalty is raised to
3. This opinion should not be read as suggesting that not all corruption must be
fought, but only that from an efficiency perspective (cost-benefit analysis), achiev-
ing a zero level of corruption may have a cost so high (including bureaucratization
costs) that it can become socially undesirable.
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the servant (A + J in equation [3]), B' increases even with Bs kept con-
stant, which tends to reduce corruption. One can also argue that an in-
crease in the penalty magnitude for both agents (J) tends to reduce
corruption even more since it negatively affects both. Another possible
conclusion derived from the model is that the increased punishment
probability (p) also tends to reduce corruption, because it tends to simul-
taneously increase B' and decrease Bs, therefore narrowing the gap, Bs -
B', on which corruption rationality ultimately depends.
In addition, we are ready to argue that an increase in the punishment
probability (p) is the most important variable in establishing an actual
corruption level equilibrium because it exponentially decreases the nu-
merator and exponentially increases the denominator in equation [4].
Consequently, the increase of the punishment probability results in an
even greater increase in the income (R) required to make corruption in-
teresting for the corruptor agent. This conclusion is consistent with sev-
eral studies on the economic analysis of crime that indicate that the best
results in fighting crimes are achieved through an increase in the likeli-
hood of arrest and conviction.
This issue was the subject of numerous studies comparing the
probability of being imprisoned and the occurrence of all types of crimes
(e.g., Ehrlich 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1982; Ehrlich & Posner 1974;
Ehrlich & Gibbons 1977; Ehrlich & Mark 1977; Ehrlich & Liu 1999),
though not without some discussion (Brier & Fienberg 1980). Regarding
this debate, Eide (Eide, Rubin & Shepherd 2006) comments that:
[t]he great majority of correlation studies and cross-section regres-
sion analyses show a clear negative association between punishment
variables and the crime rate. Almost without exception the coeffi-
cients of the punishment variables (which usually are the elasticities
of the crime rates with respect to the punishment variables) are neg-
ative, and in most of the cases significantly so.4
In line with these studies, we conclude that law enforcement has a ma-
terial deterrent effect given the theoretical model and the available em-
pirical evidence. In sum, it seems reasonable to assume from theory that
the most important variable to decrease corruption is the punishment
probability (p), followed by severity of judicial sanctions (J) to both cor-
ruptor agent and corrupted servant, and finally, the severity of adminis-
trative sanction (A) applicable to the corrupted servant only.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, because the associated costs of
increasing punishment probability (e.g., better monitoring devices, spe-
cialized prosecutors, and more judges) are normally much higher than the
costs associated with increasing punishment magnitude (basically, the leg-
islative process), we would expect the latter strategy to be more com-
monly followed than the first. In any case, theory has shown us that
4. Erling Eide, Paul Rubin & Joanna Shepherd, Economics of Crime, 2 FouNo. &
TRENDS IN MICROECONOMics 207 (2006).
WHEN CRIME PAYS
punishment probability is a key variable in fighting corruption. From an
empiric perspective, then, the question is how does one measure punish-
ment probability in corruption cases to inform future policies?
C. MEASURING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN CORRuPrION CASES
1. Measuring Corruption and Punishment Probability
In order to measure punishment probability, we would have to be able
to identify a large number of corruption cases which happened during a
given period of time (the sample space). Unfortunately, corruption cases
are highly characterized by moral hazards or hidden action problems. Al-
though we believe all criminal cases exhibit some form of occurrence un-
derreporting, the problem is especially relevant in corruption contexts.
The principal in our case (the government) is not only a legal entity,
but a legal entity with highly dispersed ownership. In the regular crimes
context, like theft or assault, the victim is individualized, and many times,
a witness of the occurrence. This makes measuring occurrence intensity
easier. Even underreporting for lack of trust in the system, fear of retali-
ation, or trauma can be mitigated by some victimization rate techniques
(Pyle 2000).
When dealing with corruption cases, most times only the agents in-
volved in the crime are actually aware of its occurrence (information
asymmetry), which leads us to the second problem: collusion. Fighting
corruption is to a large extent similar to fighting cartels because in both
scenarios the agents involved collude to achieve the illegal result without
revealing the collusion to the outside world. Hence, we say that bureau-
cratic corruption can be analyzed as a moral hazard problem; in other
words, a contract between a principal and a privately informed agent.5
Due to the information asymmetry problem, most estimates of corrup-
tion are based on the perception of corruption, like Lambsdorff (2006),
Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2006), and Woodruf (2006), but not on
corruption itself. This kind of research is done on the premise that cor-
ruption estimates derived from subjective perceptions and expertise are
correlated with underlying real levels of corruption. This method has suf-
fered recent criticism by specialists, not only because perception is mis-
leading (which may even be culturally and historically established), but
also because it can discourage transparency due to the availability bias on
perceptions when corruption is actually fought against (CGU, 2009).6 In
any case, corruption perception is not useful information if one is inter-
ested in assessing judicial performance.
5. There are many models considering corruption as an adverse selection problem,
like Tirole (1986), Laffont & Tirloe (1993) and Kofman & Lawaree (1993), while
there are others that approach the problem from a moral hazard perspective, like
Mookherjee & Png (1995).
6. The more you fight corruption, the more corruption is uncovered. However, the
more available corruption cases are (even if their absolute number decreases), the
higher the perception of corruption in a government, creating disincentives to in-
vestigate corruption cases so that government is not perceived as corrupt.
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In this context, measuring judicial performance against corruption
presents the challenge of first discovering the number of corruption cases
that happened during a given period of time or a proxy of it. Only then
can one compare this result with the number of cases where punishment
was actually imposed by the courts (judicial performance). Since direct
observation of corrupt conduct is not always possible, we searched for a
natural experiment that would serve as a proxy for such data. In the next
section we will explain why the Brazilian triple system of corruption pun-
ishment is an adequate natural experiment.
2. The Brazilian Anticorruption System: A Natural Experiment
Unlike many other places, public civil servants in Brazil enjoy a lot of
prerogatives established in theory to guarantee that they would be able to
fulfill their duties relatively immune to the ever-changing political group
in charge. Most importantly, they enjoy lifetime tenure (they can only be
fired by fault and after due process), are granted full pensions (not availa-
ble to regular workers), and are among the most well-paid workers in any
sector (though this may vary through the years).
But theory and experience tell us that these measures are not enough
to countervail corruption. Corruption is a widespread phenomenon in all
societies at all times. Aware of this possibility, and of the potential social
losses associated with corrupt lifetime servants in place, Brazilian legisla-
tors opted for a triple responsibility system where a corrupt agent can
face cumulative and independent criminal, civil, and administrative sanc-
tions for her actions.
Criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions for corruption are com-
pletely independent from each other and are carried out by different sets
of public authorities. Criminal sanctions are imposed by criminal courts,
civil sanctions are imposed by civil courts, and administrative sanctions by
administrative committees formed by peers who are not necessarily from
a legal background. Hence, the same conduct can be investigated either
independently or simultaneously by three different bodies. This redun-
dancy can be used as a natural experiment to assess how effective the
judicial system is in fighting corruption.
If we can gather all of the corruption cases identified by administrative
committees in a given period and compare these results with the punish-
ments imposed by the judicial system, either criminal or civil, for the
same conduct, we can reasonably estimate judicial performance in fight-
ing corruption for that period. One possible objection that could be
raised to our approach is that a discrepancy in administrative and judicial
conclusions may result, not from an inefficacy of the judicial system, but
from the legal restraints to which each system is subject. In other words,
there could be a discrepancy between public servants considered corrupt
by administrative committees and not guilty by courts because each adju-
dicative body works with different standards of proof or different gov-
erning statutes.
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We believe that this objection does not apply to our case because of
three things: first, the Brazilian administrative and judicial systems are
highly similar with no material difference in standards or applicable stat-
utes-only procedural differences (though due process is present in all of
them); second, according to the constitution (50, XXXV), all administra-
tive acts are subject to judicial review so any substantial discrepancy can
be resolved by appealing to the judiciary to reverse the administrative
decision; finally, although all systems are relatively independent, the evi-
dence collected in one is often borrowed by another, making the fact
findings similar in all of them.
It is important to note that evidence sharing occurs in both directions.
Judicial evidence (like telephone interceptions and financial data pro-
tected by privacy regulations) is also available to administrative commit-
tees and administrative instruments (like auditors' reports or
investigations) may serve as the basis for criminal and civil actions. These
common exchanges lead to a convergence among the judicial and admin-
istrative criteria and proof considered tainted in one proceeding would
probably be considered tainted in the other.
As a result, the actual rate of judicial reversals of administrative deci-
sions can serve as an indication of the level of divergence between judi-
cial and administrative standards. If the rate is too high, then one can
infer that judicial and administrative spheres treat the cases differently
and if the rate of reversal is low, then one can assume that the judicial
sphere considers the factual assessment of the administrative spheres ade-
quate, i.e., that their standards are close. This issue will be addressed in
section III.A [Analysis of Reinstatements]. Therefore, our approach for
measuring judicial performance against corruption assumes that if an
agent is found guilty in the administrative sphere, where he is judged
under due process, but by peers that are historically protective, and the
standard of proof is not substantially different from the judicial standard,
then the dismissed group can be used as a proxy for the whole corrupted
agents universe. Once this subset is identified, we can estimate judicial
performance by comparing this subset with the rate of judicial punish-
ment imposed for the same cases.
Judicial performance can be assessed by the following ratio, where Q;>
is the number of cases actually punished by the judicial system while Qo is
the estimated number of actual cases (punished by the administrative
system):
QP
It is also important to note that taking Qo as a proxy for cases where
corruption actually happened does not imply that the administrative pro-
cedure is assumed infallible or that no other case goes unpunished, but
only that those cases actually investigated and punished administratively
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have a high probability of corruption in accordance with the general legal
standards.
By employing this simple approach we can estimate not only the effec-
tiveness of the judicial system against corruption, but also the civil and
criminal justice systems separately. All we have to do is adjust Q, to each
area. Finally, before we move on to the data set, it is important to stress
that all administrative sanctions are duly published at the Official Gazette
and must be reported to public prosecutors. Therefore, one cannot rea-
sonably argue that any discrepancy could be attributed to an information
flow problem.
D. DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY
1. Identifying Corruption Cases-Sample Restriction
Initially, it is important to stress that most relevant information for the
present work was not available in any publicly accessible data base be-
cause the Brazilian government does not maintain any unified records of
corruption cases, dismissals, or similar information. As a result, we had
to manually collect the information by reviewing the Official Gazette for
each day during the analyzed period. Because this data mining effort in-
volved a considerable amount of work and we had access to limited re-
sources, we decided to limit our data set.
Our sample of corruption cases is composed of all federal civil servants
dismissed for corrupt practices (bureaucratic corruption) from the main
offices (Finance, Planning, Development, Industry and Foreign Trade,
Tourism, Foreign Affairs, and Agriculture and Agricultural Develop-
ment) from 1993 to 2005. These offices were chosen for their general
characteristics regarding: (a) national coverage, (b) organizational struc-
ture to fight corruption, (c) a major role in public policy, (d) diversified
characteristics of the permanent staff, (e) varying organizational cultures
and professionalism levels, (f) activities potentially more vulnerable to
corruption (police power and public procurement), and (g) an active role
in public funds allocation.
National coverage provided the set with a more comprehensive reach
and prevented potential regional effects (one region being more corrupt
than another) that could distort our results. Moreover, the presence of a
specialized structure to fight corruption makes our case stronger because
the dismissed servants considered were actually corrupt. The federal gov-
ernment maintains a professional management structure to fight corrup-
tion with an integrated system that includes internal affairs offices in
various strategic bodies such as the Federal Police, the Internal Revenue
Service, the National Institute for Social Security, and regulatory agen-
cies. We also preferred offices that have a prominent role in establishing
relevant public policy such as foreign, monetary, fiscal, budgetary, and
production and development because as the theory says, the higher the
prize, the higher the probability of corruption.
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In addition, we preferred offices with different servant profiles regard-
ing education and regular wages. Differences in educational profiles per
office can be verified at Table One-School Years of Civil Servants, where
it can be seen that both highly educated (e.g., Ministry of Finance with
71.8 percent and Ministry of Foreign Affairs with 63.6 percent) and less
educated (e.g., Tourism with 16.5 percent) offices were included. There is
also a desirable wage variety, as can be seen from Table Two-Wage Struc-
ture of Civil Servants, confirming the diversity of salaries within the
sample.
We also considered that the chosen offices have diverse organizational
cultures. In some, such as the Ministry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs,
most of the decision-making positions are occupied by career servants,
indicating professional management, while in others these positions are
preponderantly filled with non-career servants. These trends can be seen
at Table Three-Distribution of Decision Making Positions.
The type of activity performed by the office and its relation to third
parties was also considered. It is not enough to run a survey with servants
with the same academic and salary levels; it is important to consider the
activity performed and its possibility to generate illegal income. Two fac-
tors are relevant in determining the potentiality of undue income genera-
tion: (a) public procurement activities, and (b) police power (the power
to impose rights restrictions). Many studies consider these careers when
dealing with corruption like Roemer (2007), involving police officers, and
Klitgaard (1994), involving tax authorities.
The ability to provide benefits or impose restrictions on third parties is
a very relevant variable when dealing with corruption and it may explain
why, for example, one may find different levels of corruption in offices
with similar salary and education levels. In this sense, our analysis also
proves adequate as it contains various careers with police power, such as
tax auditors (Internal Revenue Service), the financial system (Central
Bank), securities markets (CVM), insurance (Susep), and pest control
(Ministry of Agriculture). Moreover, it should be emphasized that some
of these offices play a significant role in the control and release of budget
allocations, especially the Ministries of Planning and Finance. Therefore,
we believe that our sample of civil servants dismissed for corruption is
representative of the total amount of corrupted agents.
Once we established our sample qualitative restrictions, our next step
was to determine our temporal restrictions. We decided to limit our re-
search to the 1993 to 2005 period so that we could take into considera-
tion: (a) the publication and actual enforcement of the then-new
administrative statute (Law no 8112, of 1990) that has governed discipli-
nary sanctions since December 1990, assuming that its effects could be
better assessed after a two-year lag; and (b) a four-year period as a rea-
sonable timeframe for courts to sentence someone already administra-
tively dismissed for corruption. Since the data was collected in 2009, this
delay allowed us to reasonably evaluate the proceedings' progress. The
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inclusion of the latest dismissals could artificially decrease judicial effec-
tiveness by giving too little time for judicial review.
2. Data Collection
Once our sample was selected, we reviewed each Official Gazette for
all dismissed servants during the relevant period. Our initial search in-
cluded all servants that were sanctioned with punishment normally asso-
ciated with corruption such as dismissal, pension forfeiture, and removal
from designated functions. Once this broader sample was gathered, we
processed it to classify the legal ground for each sanction and filtered
from the sample those dismissals unrelated to corruption.7
After all identified corruption cases were listed, we scanned the judicial
databases for each of these servants in search of any criminal or civil pro-
ceeding irrespective of whether it was concluded or ongoing. This search
included those cases where annulment of the administrative decision was
sought and reinstatement requested. Our search covered all federal
courts, the Superior Court of Law-STJ (the highest authority in legal
matters), and the Federal Supreme Court-STF (the highest authority in
constitutional matters). The results of our research are presented in the
next section.
III. RESULTS
A. ANALYSIS OF REINSTATEMENTS
As previously mentioned, in Brazil, no administrative act is immune to
judicial review. Therefore, in order to make our case stronger, we can
use the degree of reversal of administrative dismissals as a test for the
legal soundness of these decisions. If we find a high degree of reversals,
one could reasonably argue that it is not the judicial system that is inef-
fective, but just the opposite-that it is the administrative system that may
be arbitrary.
Another possible view is that if there were a significant degree of rein-
statements, there would be strong evidence of standard divergence be-
tween the administrative and judicial systems which could lead us to
indeterminacies. In either case, the comparison we employed here would
be much weaker. But the data does not support these positions.
For our purposes, reinstatements here are considered the cases where
the dismissed servant was ordered back to service by a judicial order.
This possibility is expressly established by Art. 28 of Law no 8112, of 1990,
called the Servants Statute. When analyzing the reinstatement data as
presented in Table Four-Overview of Reinstatement Claims, the first im-
portant conclusion is that reinstatement actions are relatively common
with more than half of the dismissed servants filing one or more suits to
be reinstated (224 servants).
7. A civil servant may be punished with any of those penalties in other cases like
continuous unjustified absence from work.
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Of those who sued for reinstatement, only twenty-nine were granted a
reinstatement order, though a third (nine) of these rulings are still pend-
ing appeal. As a result, only 4.53 percent of the dismissed servants (441)
were judicially reinstated and even if we restrict our comparison to those
who actually challenged the administrative dismissal (224), the resulting
reinstatements amount only to 8.93 percent of the cases.
It is also important to emphasize that 104 reinstatement actions were
already definitely rejected and seventy-seven were rejected pending ap-
peal. This means that 46.04 percent of challenges were already rejected,
i.e., there was already a definitive judicial ruling upholding the adminis-
trative finding. Both numbers indicate that the assertion that most of the
dismissed servants return to service is a myth. Ergo, it is reasonable to
use the administrative dismissal cases as a proxy for actual cases of cor-
ruption in order to estimate judicial effectiveness of both the civil and the
criminal systems.
B. MEASURING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE - THE RESULTS
From 1993 to 2005, we were able to identify 687 dismissed civil servants
(see Table Five - Total Dismissed Servants) of which 246 (35.81 percent)
were dismissed for reasons unrelated to corruption and 441 (64.19 per-
cent) were actually involved in corrupt practices.
These results are consistent with another recent study (Rocha & Alen-
car, 2009) that investigated the causes (whether linked to corruption or
not) of dismissal from the federal public service during another period
(July 2001 to June 2009). This study encompassed all federal servants
(see Table Six - Legal Grounds for Public Servants Dismissals). Both
studies indicate that approximately two-thirds of federal civil servant dis-
missals are linked with corrupt practices. The most important cause of
servant dismissal after corruption is unjustified absence from work, either
by dereliction of duty (absence for more than thirty consecutive days) or
usual absence (sixty absences or more interpolated over a period of
twelve months).
A more detailed exposition with general results and the criminal judi-
cial system performance is presented in Table Seven - Dismissed Civil
Servants and Criminal Actions. The first interesting conclusion that we
can extract from Table Seven is that only a third of corrupt servants ad-
ministratively dismissed (34.01 percent) face criminal charges. Because
these figures refer to cases where corruption was already well-docu-
mented, but only a third of the servants were charged, it is reasonable to
assume that the probability of facing criminal charges for corrupt prac-
tices is well below thirty percent.
It is important to note that those figures are for individuals facing crim-
inal charges only and that does not necessarily mean that the law will be
enforced. In fact, things get even grimmer when we look for actual con-
victions, as we only found fourteen servants who were definitely con-
victed. Based on our assumption that administrative convictions are a
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strong indicator of actual corruption, we can estimate judicial perform-
ance of the criminal system as approximately three percent:
Ocr 14
- = _- = 3.17 percent
Qo 441
It is also worth mentioning that even this low enforcement figure does
not necessarily represent actual prison time because imprisonment can be
commuted to another punishment depending on the severity of the im-
posed sanction. Overall, the unfortunate result we found is that the
chance that someone will face jail time in Brazil for being corrupt is near
zero. Things are not that different when dealing with civil sanctions.
At first, one could expect a better performance in the civil judicial sys-
tem because the misconduct statutes have much broader language than
the criminal ones. In practice, every single legal ground for administra-
tive dismissal also constitutes legal grounds for civil liability for miscon-
duct so we expected a much higher degree of convergence between the
administrative and civil systems. Unfortunately, that was not the case.
Reviewing the collected data (see Table Eight-Dismissed Civil Servants
and Civil Actions of Improbity), we found that only 107 administratively
dismissed servants were sued, with some of them being sued more than
once (122 lawsuits were found). This means that less than a fourth of
corrupt servants administratively dismissed (24.26 percent) face civil
charges. In addition, from the general pool of civil actions through 2009,
we found only thirteen rulings. Notwithstanding the fact that many more
civil actions were filed against corrupt servants, the actual results are
even more disappointing than those from the criminal system: only seven
concluded lawsuits were found, that is cases where no appeal was still
pending judgment (res judicata).
With these numbers and applying the same methodology, we can esti-
mate judicial performance of the civil system as less than two percent:
Oct 7
- = - = 1.59 percent
Qo 441
Even if we tried to combine both criminal and civil sanctions, putting
aside the possibility of some redundancy, the judicial system performance
would not improve much, as the rate of success would still be below five
percent:
QC 21
- = _- = 4.76 percent
Qo 441
As we can see from the results, the general perception that corrupt
people never answer to justice in Brazil is not at all exaggerated. We
could just change "never" to "almost never" in order to be more precise.
In any case, taking theory into consideration, it is reasonable to infer that
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because judicial performance is so poor, the probability of punishment of
corruption is very low. Therefore, we would expect corruption to be
highly profitable and present in Brazil.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we tried to assess whether or not the Brazilian judicial
system, including both criminal and civil courts, was effective in the fight
against corruption. Our results are unequivocal to show that it is not. In
fact, according to the data, the chance of being criminally prosecuted for
corruption is less than 34.01 percent and the chance of facing civil charges
is even lower, 24.26 percent. On top of that, the chance of actually being
criminally convicted is only around three percent and the chance of being
held liable in civil action is even slimmer, at less than two percent. It is
fair to affirm that judicial anti-corruption enforcement in Brazil is negligi-
ble and that it only makes the administrative control system more
relevant.
Because the rational agent is normally worried about p, that is, the
probability of being punished and not the probability of being tried, it
flows from the theory above that, at present, there is a high incentive for
corruption in Brazil because the corrupt servant is almost certain of going
unpunished. Here, the popular perception is actually correct.
Our results imply that the Brazilian path from a closed to an open soci-
ety, which has been publicized for several decades, may be jeopardized by
the current levels of bureaucratic corruption (not to mention political
corruption not addressed here). Because the probability of punishment is
one of the most relevant variables in determining the level of criminal
activity, one would expect corruption levels to be still very high in Brazil.
A high corruption level is almost certain to curtail social cooperation and
to weaken a state's capability of implementing good social policy (if it
tries).
It is important to stress that no effort was made to explain such poor
results or to identify the associated probable causes. These questions are
left as a research agenda. We hope that other scholars will be interested
in our work and will make some effort to extend, explain, or contest it. In
any case, as unpleasant as it is, we have shown that-at least for
now-crime pays in Brazil.
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Table 1 - School Years of Civil Servants
Graduate Intermediate Primary Unavailable Total
Offices Ot. % Ot. I % Ot. % Qt. % Qt.
Presidency of the 2.050 27,4 1.708 22,8 29 0,4 3.697 49,4 7.484Republic
General Law of 6.419 71,6 1.194 13,3 31 0,3 1.318 14,7 8.962
the Union
Agric., Pec. and 4.070 33,8 6.146 51,1 1.293 10,7 522 4,3 12.031Supplying
Cities 201 42,1 73 15,3 - - 204 42,7 478
Science and 3.415 50,3 3.007 44,2 39 0,6 335 4,9 6.796Technology
Communications 778 39,1 771 38,7 1 0,1 442 22,2 1.992
Culture 1.418 47,9 977 33,0 69 2,3 498 16,8 2.962
Defense 5.245 19,4 16.455 60,8 3.037 11,2 2.320 8,6 27.057
Agrarian 2.370 35,7 3.792 57,2 4 0,1 464 7,0 6.630Development
Social
Development and 108 15,7 100 14,5 - - 480 69,8 688
Hunger Combat
Development,
Industry and For. 1.305 46,9 1.267 45,5 25 0,9 188 6,8 2.785
Trade
Education 109.717 56,8 65.179 33,7 11.486 5,9 6.863 3,6 193.245
Sport 12 5,2 44 18,9 1 0,4 176 75,5 233
Finance 23.564 71,8 8.322 25,3 458 1,4 496 1,5 32.840
Governments of
the Former- 5.197 31,5 9.454 57,3 1.855 11,2 3 0,0 16.509
Territories
National 563 20,3 1.848 66,5 1 0,0 366 13,2 2.778Integration
Justice 3.563 12,5 23.239 81,7 375 1,3 1.254 4,4 28.431
Environment 3.515 41,0 2.995 34,9 149 1,7 1.924 22,4 8.583
Mines and Energy 1.427 44,5 1.249 39,0 22 0,7 506 15,8 3.204
Planning, Budget 3.385 19,1 9.946 56,0 42 0,2 4.395 24,7 17.768
and Management
Social Security 9.609 24,2 29.303 73,7 77 0,2 786 2,0 39.775
Foreign affairs 2.215 63,6 1.195 34,3 4 0,1 69 2,0 3.483
Health 27.002 25,6 63.488 60,1 6.190 5,9 8.928 8,5 105.608
Work and Job 3.471 49,4 3.300 47,0 33 0,5 216 3,1 7.020
Transports 1.467 26,6 3.282 59,4 35 0,6 739 13,4 5.523
Tourism 71 16,5 112 26,0 1 0,2 247 57,3 431
Total 222.157 40,9 258.446 47,6 25.257 4,6 37.436 6,9 543.296
Source: Ministry of the Planning, Budget and Management.
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Table 2 - Wage Structure of Civil Servants
Position Initial wage Final wage
Ministry of Finance Attorney 14.549,53 18.260,00
Inspector of Internal Revenue Service 13.067,00 18.260,00
Diplomat, Central Bank Analyst, Analyst of Planning
and Budget, Analyst of Finances and Control, 12.413,65 17.347,00
Specialists in Public Politics
Inspector of Ministry of Agriculture 9.552,00 13.400,00
Agronomist Engineer of INCRA 4.349,37 6.580,51
Administrative positions (graduate) - Ministry of 3.534,22 5.650,00Finance
Administrative analyst of INCRA (graduate) 3.348,41 5.067,08
Administrative positions (graduate) - General 2.870,19 3.405,04
Administrative positions (intermediate) - Ministry of 2.590,42 3.147,11Finance
Administrative positions (intermediate) - General 2.148,47 2.448,44
Administrative positions (auxiliary) - Ministry of 2.124,46 2.160,78Finance
Source: Ministry of the Planning, Budget and Management (Values in Brazilian Reais).
Table 3 - Distribution of Decision Making Positions
Sources: IRS, Ministry of Agriculture,
INCRA, Ministry of Planning.
Secretariat of the Patrimony of the Union - MPOG,
Internal External
Temp Career Career
Positions Servants Servant Outsiders
Qt. % Qt. % Qt. %
IRS Regional 10 10 100,00% 0 0% 0 0%Superintendents
IRS Local Chiefs 120 120 100,00% 0 0% 0 0%
Federal
Superintendents of 27 14 51,85% 6 22,22% 7 25,92%
Agriculture
Patrimony of the 29 8 27,58% 5 17,24% 16 55,17%Union Local Chiefs
INCRASurin 30 9 30% 4 13,33% 17 56,67%Superintendents
Ministry of the
Agrarian Development 26 0 0% 7 26,93% 19 73,07%
Commission Agents
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Table 4 - Overview of Reinstatement Claims (1993-2005)
Former-
MAP MDA MDIC MTUR MF MPOG MRE territories TOTAL
Dismissed Servants 45 57 19 1 255 44 14 6 441
Reinstatement 30 58 17 3 180 32 8 5 333Actions
Servants that Sued 23 33 9 1 124 24 7 3 224
Preliminary 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 6Injunctions
Reinstatement 0 4 0 1 21 3 0 0 29Rulings
Definite
Reinstatement 0 6 6 0 6 1 1 0 20
Rulings
Negative Ruling 5 18 0 1 39 8 2 4 77
Definite Negative 9 18 8 0 56 10 3 0 104
Rulings I I
Source: Federal Official Gazette and Federal Judiciary Power.
Table 5 - Total Dismissed Servants (1993-2005)
Former
1993 - 2005 MAP MDA MDIC MTUR MF MPOG MRE Territories Total
Corruption- related 45 57 19 1 255 44 14 6 441
Other Reasons 41 12 4 1 78 30 15 65 246
Total 86 69 23 2 333 74 29 71 687
Source: Federal Official Gazette.
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Table 6 - Legal Grounds for Public Servants Dismissals
(July, 2001 to June, 2009)
433
Before After
Legal grounds Corruption Disciplinary Disciplinary
(Law no 8.112/90) Link Reason System (%) System (%)
117 - IX Strong Take advantage of 30,5 37,0position
132 - IV Strong Administrative 25,5 18,8improbity
132 - X Strong Injury to the 9,8 3,9
public patrimony
117 - XI Strong Act of receiving 3,2 7,1gifts
132 - XI Strong Corruption 0,2 2,8
117 - XI Strong Per formance as 0,8 2,1
solicitor
Total of penalties with STRONG linking with the 70,0 71,7
corruption
132-11 Weak Dereliction of 11,3 9,8
duty
132 - III Weak Usual absence 3,2 2,1
117 - XV Weak Laziness 8,7 6,1
117 - X Weak Management of 1,3 1,5
1 private societies
Total of penalties with WEAK linking with the 24,5 19,5
corruption
Others 5,5 8,8
System of the Federal
Source: Rocha & Alencar (2009).
Note: averages before and after the creation of the Disciplinary
Executive Branch.
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Table 7 - Dismissed Civil Servants and Criminal Actions (1993-2005)
Former
1993 - 2005 MAP MDA MDIC MTUR MF MPOG MRE Territories TOTAL
Dismissed 45 57 19 1 255 44 14 6 441Servants
Filed Criminal 13 28 3 1 165 9 4 1 224Actions
Servants
Criminally 12 26 2 1 97 8 3 1 150
Prosecuted
Convictions 0 4 0 1 39 1 0 0 45Pending Appeal
Definite
Convictions (res 2 2 0 0 8 0 2 0 14
judicata)
Dismissal Pending 0 0 0 0 8 2 1 0 11Appeal
Definitive
Dismissal (res 2 3 0 0 17 2 0 0 24
judiciata)
Source: Federal Official Gazette and Judicial Databases.
Table 8 - Dismissed Civil Servants and
(1993-2005)
Source: Federal Official Gazette and Federal Judiciary Power.
Civil Actions of Improbity
